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AGENCY THEORY PROBLEMS BEHIND 
THE FALL OF SHOPPING CENTERS
The financial and economic crisis starting in 2008, has 
marked the life of several real estate project and invest-
ment worldwide. This negative effect got more inten-
sive in emerging markets (Sliupas – Simanaviciene, 
2010; Golob et al., 2012; Cocconcelli – Medda, 2013) 
and Romania was of no exception. Therefore in the last 
years, several shopping centers were closed, the deliv-
ery of some of them were postponed; and quite some of 
them changed owners either through bankruptcy, pub-
lic tender, forced execution or in luckier cases through 
direct negotiations. It would be myopic to state that the 
fall of these shopping centers was amongst others not 
influenced by an inappropriate location, by the over-
estimated demand and purchasing power or by the ne-
glected competition. This is especially true in case of 
the closed shopping centers. But shopping centers in 
operation with an occupancy rate of ca. 80% also be-
came endangered. As Burr (2011: p. 7.) states “the de-
cline of the commercial real estate and commercial real 
estate mortgage markets started later and was arguably 
more of a result than a cause of the recession.“ In their 
cases the problem started from the pressure in repaying 
bank loans and credits contracted during the develop-
ment of the shopping centers, while “stricter underwrit-
ing guidelines and declining asset values have made 
the refinancing of commercial real estate assets very 
challenging” (Blurr, 2011: p. 7.). External Investors 
(Lenders) lost their patience, trust and confidence and 
started own measures for debt recovery. These indicate 
a rupture in the cooperation of shopping center industry 
actors and signal agency theory related problems, espe-
cially in terms of risk sharing. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989: p. 59.) “overall, the domain of agency theory is 
relationships that mirror the basic agency structure of 
a principal and an agent who are engaged in a coop-
erative behavior, but have differing goals and differing 
attitudes towards risk.” The institutional background of 
the shopping center industry requires a strong coopera-
tive behavior between Investors, Developers and Ex-
ternal Investors (Lenders), although each of them has 
different goals and attitudes towards risk. Therefore the 
institutional background of the shopping industry urges 
the use of agency perspectives in the analysis of these 
failures, ten in number.
The article is consisting of seven major chapters. 
After the introduction, we discuss the main remarks 
in the relevant literature and formulate the theoretical 
background of the shopping center industry specific 
principal-agent problems. We formulate the research 
questions and develop some propositions, which will 
The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. 
The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerg-
ing markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings 
or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency 
theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple 
cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Inves-
tor-Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of 
the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection 
problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical 
evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.
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be tested by the analysis of 10 shopping center failure 
in Romania trough the method of multiple-cases study. 
The logic behind the adequacy of the chosen research 
method is explained in the fifth chapter. We follow with 
the detailed description of the cases and their analysis 
through the lens of the 3 scenarios from the previously 
formulated principal-agent relationships. The pattern 
matching and cross-cases synthesis provide results 
in order to accept or reject the propositions. The last 
chapter summarizes the conclusions and provides rec-
ommendations for future researches.
Literature review
The current financial crisis started due to a bubble in 
asset prices during the fall of 2008, is not the first one 
and certainly not going to be neither the last one. Al-
len – Gale (2000: p. 236.) recall as historical exam-
ples “the Dutch Tulipmania, the South Sea bubble in 
England, the Mississippi bubble in France, the Great 
Crash of 1929” and more close examples are the rock-
eting rise of real estate and stock prices at the late 
1980s in Japan and their subsequent collapse in the 
beginning of the 1990s or the dot.com crash in 2000. 
All these crises triggered the same consequences on 
real estates: high vacancy rates, drastic fall of rental 
prices, the foreclosure of mortgages with the so-called 
initial owners wiped out and lenders overtaking prop-
erties in the pursuit of investment protection (Whee-
lock, 1931).  The seeds of these bubbles and crises 
were analyzed by several researchers (Allen – Gorton, 
1993; Allen – Gale, 2000; Sliupas – Simanaviciene, 
2010; Fanning et al., 2011; Acharya – Naqvi, 2012), 
who all found that the bubbles in asset prices are due 
to financial liberalization with increase in lending and 
abundantly available cheap capital during of which 
transactional purchase prices shift away from the fun-
damental values of the assets. The bubbles burst in 
the moment market actors reach to the point where 
their future price expectations turns from increase to 
decrease. Sliupas – Simanaviciene (2010) found evi-
dence that the housing price inflation in Lithuania was 
very strongly influenced by the speculative housing 
price expectation with ca. 50% in comparison with 
GDP (PPP) per capita, which influence countered only 
for 18,25%. When the speculative price expectancy 
starts to fall, asset prices indeed fall drastically within 
a short period of time and are followed by a longer 
wave of defaults of firms who borrowed money to buy 
assets at inflated peak prices, of banking institutions 
and foreign exchange rates. If we look deeper, we’ll 
find that the increase in lending is actually the result 
of agency problems between investors, banks, lend-
ers and portfolio managers (Allen – Gorton, 1993), of 
risk shifting or asset substitution in cases of borrow-
ing for pre-existing assets, of expectations in future 
credit expansions (Allen – Gale, 2000) and of agency 
problems within banks through asymmetric informa-
tion in the banking system (Mishkin, 1997) and moral 
hazard through bonus awarded risk-taking behavior, 
where bonuses are distributed based on the volume 
of financed assets and thus leading to “excessive 
lending and asset price bubbles” (Acharya – Naqvi, 
2012: p. 350.). These agency problems are the roots 
of asset price bubbles, but they become visible only 
once the bubble bursts and during the long wave of 
defaults. Researchers than focus on flattening meas-
ures like land tax use (Cocconcelli – Medda, 2013) 
or on efficient organizational structures like UPREIT 
(Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trust) 
(Ebrahim – Mathur, 2013) or on banking operations 
of evergreening (shift from high-quality borrowers to 
low-quality borrowers) and writing off NPL’s (non-
performing loans) (Watanabe, 2010). From all these, 
actually UPREIT’s might represent a preventive solu-
tion to alleviate moral hazard in CDO’s and are “de-
signed to mitigate transaction costs […], administra-
tive costs, bankruptcy costs, illiquidity costs […] and 
to minimize endogenous agency costs of debt” (Ebra-
him – Mathur, 2013: p. 302.).
The present article analyses the effects of the crisis 
on a very specific part of the real estate industry, more 
precisely on the shopping centers, in contrast to previ-
ous studies which were focused on the residential real 
estate market (Sliupas – Simanaviciene, 2010; Golob 
et al., 2012; Cocconcelli – Medda, 2013). Shopping 
centers are special products of the real estate industry 
developed with the pursuit of achieving profit through 
the so-called “exit” or selling of the center, which can 
have a form of forward purchase or after completion. 
Shopping centers are also distinct real estate projects 
which during their development undergo project fi-
nancing, financing of pre-existent assets. For the pur-
pose of effective project financing the financed pro-
jects are allocated to distinct project companies, the 
so called “special purpose vehicles” (SPV). According 
to Jensen (1983: p. 361.) SPV’s are agents of others 
which aid “avoiding personal liability for loans to fi-
nance the acquisition, construction, improvement, or 
refinancing of a business venture and protecting trans-
ferred property from attachment by, or from the claims 
of, creditors of individual investors”. The loans are to 
be repaid from the project company’s cash flow dur-
ing the operation of the project, with limited warranty 
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from the developer’s side and thus direct risk from 
the lender’s or investor’s side. These projects “tap 
the financial markets in two main ways. First, project 
sponsors or third-party investors (usually specialized 
investment funds) issue equity” in the form of ordi-
nary shares or subordinate debt, a type of quasi-equity 
which is also called mezzanine capital. […] Second, 
the senior debt in 80% of the cases is bank debt “syndi-
cated” on the international financial markets” (Lyonnet 
du Moutier, 2010: p. 128–129.). Due to this two-fold 
project financing, the debt-to-equity ratio in SPV’s are 
quite high, usually between 60-90% of the total invest-
ment. The revenue risk is borne by external investors 
(financing banks. lenders) and investors. Therefore 
external investors and lenders try to secure their in-
vestments and preserve their interests by a series of 
complex contractual schemes, through which they ac-
quire ownership right surrogates (Flaskár, 2011) over 
the financed asset and the project company: mortgage 
on asset, pledge on shares, mortgage on receivables, 
insurances and accounts and rights of first refusal on 
transfer of assets or shares of the SPV. According to 
Shah – Thakor (1987) the high debt-to-equity ratio in 
project financing is sustained by reduced information 
asymmetry due to the usage of SPV’s. Nevertheless, 
the high debt-to-equity ratio inherently suggests that 
this field is based on highly opportunistic behavior and 
therefore provides an interesting context for agency 
theory analysis.
In the present article, the view of analysis over the 
effects of the crisis for the shopping center industry is 
on a longer term and tackles the agency problems con-
tributing to the fall of these shopping centers. Despite 
the fact that the fall of shopping centers was more a 
result of, than a cause to the financial and economic 
crisis beginning in 2008 (Blurr, 2011), the thus started 
long wave of defaults shed light on some agency prob-
lems within the shopping center industry. The agency 
theory related problems will be assessed alongside of 
other complementary organizational economics theo-
ries such as transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1991) 
and property rights theory (Kim – Mahoney, 2005). 
Organizational economics „is grounded on economic 
model of human behavior which assumes that individ-
ual’s behavior is opportunistic, self-serving and moti-
vated by satisfying personal goals” (Podrug et al., 2010: 
p. 1227.) and for a better overview on organizational 
economics theories we rely on Table 1 summarizing the 
main aspects of these theories.
Organizational economics theories, however are fo-
cusing on different contractual aspects, are all designed 
to complementarily explain and predict the behavior of 
certain actors in a specific field or market taking into 
consideration the complexity of relationships. The pre-
sent article builds on the positivist stream of agency 
theory describing the shopping center industry from 
an agency theory approach, identifying agency prob-
lems between actors of this field. From this point of 
view, the present article relies on studies like of Jensen 
– Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Argawal – Man-
delker (1987) which are focusing on agency problems 
within the relationship of shareholders, stakeholders 
Criteria Agency Theory Property Rights Theory Transaction Costs Theory
Key Idea
Principal-agent relationships should 
reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs.
Partitioning of property rights 
and efficient reallocation of 
them amongst contracting 
parties.
Transaction contracts should 
reflect efficiency by minimizing 
transaction costs for both 
contracting parties.
Unit of analysis
Contract between principal and 
agent – behavior vs. outcome based 
remuneration.
A special contractual situation 
– a configuration of property 
rights (e.g. an institutional 
arrangement)
Transaction contract – various 
types of asset specificity.
Contracting problems
Moral hazard.
Adverse selection.
Risk sharing.
Externalities. 
Rent seeking. 
Vested interests and rights. 
Week appropriability.
Maladaptation. 
Adverse selection. 
Holdup problems.
Human Assumptions Self-interest, bounded rationality and risk aversion.
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict, efficiency and information asymmetry.
Market assumptions Un-observability, uncertainty and asset specificity.
Table 1
Overview of Organization Economics Theories
Source: based on Eisenhardt (1989: pg. 59.) and  Kim – Mahoney (2005: p. 231.)
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and managers; on studies of Allen – Gorton (1993), Al-
len – Gale (2000) assessing risk sharing agency prob-
lems between investors and portfolio managers, and 
between lenders and borrowers with limited liability; 
on the study of Levitt – Syverson (2008) detailing in-
formation asymmetry agency problems between real 
estate agents and their clients during transactions; and 
on the study of Acharya – Naqvi (2012) about moral 
hazard agency problems within banks. The novelty of 
the article is however that it analyses agency problems 
of the shopping center industry, which hasn’t been as-
sessed previously, as most studies focus on the residen-
tial market. 
Another novelty of the present article is in its re-
search method, analyzing these agency problems in 
multiple cases and on a longer term from their occur-
rence till their solution. Usually studies focusing on 
agency problems provide solutions only on a theoreti-
cal level, recommending mathematical functions or 
special contractual constructs. In contrast to most of 
those studies, the present article focuses on micro level 
cases instead of a macro-level approach and presents 
empirical solutions.
Theoretical background
Principal-Agent Relationships in the Shopping 
Center Industry
In the shopping center industry agency theory re-
lated problems have two roots: ownership and invested 
capital. The occurrence and deepening of the agency 
theory related problems depends quite much on who 
owns the respective SPV incorporating the shopping 
center, and on what kind of relationship exists between 
the center owner and the investors, external lenders, 
developers and center managers. The other factor in 
the evolution of agency theory related problems is the 
project financing, the invested capital, i.e. from whose 
capital will the shopping center be developed. Owner-
ship and financing structures have been in the focus of 
agency theory related research of organizations since 
the works of Jensen – Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) 
and Argawal – Mandelker (1987). Nevertheless, the 
present article is pioneering in applying these concepts 
to the shopping center industry.
The principal-agent theory related problems are 
characteristic especially for the relationships between 
center managers, developers and investors. Shopping 
Market Actors Ownership Financing Development Lease Operation Risk Information Control
Investors X X X
Developers X X X X X X X X
Center Managers X X X X X X X
Market Actors Ownership Financing Development Lease Operation Risk Information Control
Investors X X X
Developers X X X X
Center Managers X X X X
Market Actors Ownership Financing Development Lease Operation Risk Information Control
Investors X X X
Developers X X X X X X X
Center Managers X X X
Table 2
Distribution of main activities and agency theory problems when a single corporation (group) plays  
the role of investor, developer and center manager
Table 3
Distribution of main activities and agency theory problems when distinct corporations (groups) play
the role of investor, developer and center manager 
Table 4
Distribution of main activities and  
agency theory problems when separate corporations (groups) play  the role of developer and center manager,
while both play the role of investorsr
Source: own observation
Source: own observation
Source: own observation
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center’s investors are banks (external 
investors), various investment funds or 
private investors. The developers cre-
ate the shopping center using the capi-
tal of these investors, thus they should 
act in accordance with the interests of 
investors even if it means against their 
own interests. The situation is the same 
in case of center managers, as they 
should operate the respective shopping 
center as it were their own and should 
apply the most profitable and cost-
effective measures in order to achieve 
the expected returns for the investors.
In order to avoid conflicts of inter-
est or the appearance of agency theory 
related problems, the optimal case is 
when the role of the investor, devel-
oper and facility manager is played by 
a single corporate group and when the 
financing is entirely own capital. But 
cases like this are very rare, they hap-
pen ”once in a blue moon”. Therefore, 
in the majority of cases the following 
three scenarios occur:
1. Scenario 1: the role of the inves-
tor, developer and center manager is 
played by one single corporate group, 
but for financing the shopping center 
foreign capital from various banks or 
other credit institutions are used in the 
form of long term loans. There is an 
external investor, credit institution, 
bringing a large amount of foreign 
capital, in the background as Principal 
(Table 2 and Figure 1).
2. Scenario 2: distinct corpora-
tions (groups) play the role of inves-
tors, developers and center managers. 
In these cases the ownership is at the 
investing parent company, which fi-
nances the required costs from their 
own capital as subordinate debt or 
mezzanine capital, sometimes together 
with a co-investor.  An external inves-
tor is usually also present (Table 3 and 
Figure 2).
3. Scenario 3: separate corporati-
ons (groups) carry out the develop-
ment activity and center management 
activity, while both play the role of 
investors. The characteristic of this 
Figure 1
Principal-Agent Relationship when the role
of the investor, developer and center manager is played by
one corporate group
Figure 2
Principal-Agent Relationship when 
distinct corporations (groups) play the role of investor,
developer and center manager
Figure 3
Principal-Agent Relationship when separate 
corporations (groups) play the role of developer and center manager,
while both play the role of investors
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structure is that ownership changes hands on short and 
medium-term. In the beginnings, during the develop-
ment of the shopping center, the ownership is by the 
developer, who plays also the role of the investor, in 
most cases with the help of external investors who are 
financing the project with long term loans (Table 4 and 
Figure 3).
Beside these three basic relational structures, there 
are other relational, institutional variations as well, but 
these are the ones that appear the most. In these cases, 
we encounter different risk distribution ways, different 
occurrence of information asymmetry and different ex-
ercise of control.
Agency Theory Related Problems in the  
Shopping Center Industry
The above mentioned, most often met, institutional 
relationship structures lead to various agency theory 
problems like: risk sharing, moral hazard and adverse 
selection.
Risk sharing problem occurs for instance between 
the External Investor as Principal and the Investor-De-
veloper as Agent described in Scenario 1. The debt-
to-equity ratio in a Project Company varies between 
60–90% from the total investment of the respective 
shopping center. Therefore the Principal who offers fi-
nancing based on a loan agreement in the form of sen-
ior debt is bearing the outmost part of the risks from 
the investment. In return, the Principal receives only an 
assurance that the mezzanine capital from the Investor-
Developer as Agent will be considered a subordinate 
loan, and some ownership surrogates like mortgage 
on asset, on receivables, on the shares of the project 
company etc. Nevertheless, there is no warranty of a 
full repayment in case of insolvency or bankruptcy of 
the project company and/or in case of a serious depre-
ciation in the shopping center’s value. In such cases 
of failed investments, there is no equitable sharing of 
losses proportionately with the investment contribu-
tion, neither any security for the Principal or the Agent 
to cover all losses. Depending on the degree of the loss, 
it might happen that in absolute value, the Principal’s 
loss is greater than the one of the Agent, due to the 
high debt-to-equity ratio. A similar risk sharing prob-
lem might occur also in case of Scenario 2. between the 
two parenting companies when the Investor as Princi-
pal have a senior debt over the subordinate debt of the 
Developer as Agent.
Moral hazard might appear in Scenario 2. between 
the Investor as Principal and the Developer as Agent. 
Although, both of them are co-investors and co-owners 
in the project company and both provide equity in the 
form of mezzanine capital, subordinate debt; the de-
velopment works (planning, permitting, construction, 
leasing and opening) are performed exclusively by the 
Developer as Agent based on a development agree-
ment and for which tasks the developer receives a de-
velopment fee from the project company. In this case 
information asymmetry appears, as most of the mar-
ket information relevant to the success of the shopping 
center is at the Developer as Agent, whose work can’t 
be completely monitored by the Investor as Principal. 
The effects of moral hazard might be even deeper, in 
case of a forward purchase agreement between the 
Investor as Principal and the Developer as Agent for 
buying the Developer’s shares from the project com-
pany for a fixed price at the completion of the shopping 
center. In this case the Developer is more tempted to act 
opportunistically and earn as much as possible during 
the development of the shopping center on the costs of 
the Investor. A similar situation of moral hazard might 
appear between the Investor as Principal and the Center 
Manager as Agent based on a management agreement. 
The outcome of such agreement is more predictable 
and measureable, while the tasks to be performed are 
also programmable, the Principal posses more tools to 
verify and control the behavior of the Agent; therefore 
the remuneration of the Agent is usually twofold, hav-
ing a fixed part for the verifiable behavior and an out-
come based bonus part.
Adverse selection suggests an opportunistic be-
havior before entering into a contract, thus a perfect 
example appears in Scenario 3. between the Investor-
Developer as Agent and the Investor-Center Manager 
as Principal based on a sale purchase agreement to be 
concluded after completion of the shopping center. In 
this case the Agent bears the advantage of the Seller in 
comparison with the Buyer as Principal. Despite the fact 
that the Buyer carries out legal, financial and technical 
due diligences, it is still impossible to verify all aspects 
of the shopping center and project company. Therefore, 
in most of the cases the value of the shopping cent-
er or project company is overrated and the Principal 
pays a much higher transactional purchase price to the 
Agent instead of its fundamental value, while minimiz-
ing the transaction costs. After the sale-purchase is ex-
ecuted, it remains on the Principal’s skills and abilities 
to maximize the profits of the project company as an 
Investor-Center Manager. Similar situations might oc-
cur in Scenario 2 between the Investor as Principal and 
the Developer or Center Manager as Agent. In case of 
Center Managers, whose work is highly programmable 
and the outcomes are measureable, the problems of ad-
verse selection might be diminished with an appropriate 
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contract structure. The Developers tasks are in contrast 
very complex and unforeseeable, un-measurable there-
fore adverse selection might be a considerable agency 
problem in their case. If Developers don’t possess the 
required know-how, experience and contact capital for 
a successful shopping center development, they might 
cause significant harm and loss to the Investors, which 
might occur during development or after completion.
Research questions and propositions
This study focuses on how principal-agent problems in-
fluence the fall of shopping centers? It would be myopic 
to state that principal-agent problems are the only source 
of fall for shopping centers and to neglect the lacks in 
selecting the appropriate Location, in overestimating 
purchasing power and demand or in the failure of ana-
lyzing competition. The financial and economic crisis 
also accentuated the effects of these problem sources, 
especially since the industry of shopping centers is very 
capital demanding. Nevertheless, the focus here is on as-
sessing the principal-agent problems within the context 
of the shopping center industry as a factor contributing 
to their fall. The main goal of the present article is to re-
veal agency theory related problems underlying the fall 
of shopping centers while finding the logic between the 
problems and the out-coming real-life solutions. There-
fore we formulate the following propositions:
 0. Fall of shopping centers: There is a principal-
agent problem behind each shopping center fall 
as a contributing source, at least in the form of 
a risk sharing problem due to project financing.
 1. Risk sharing: The lower debt-to-equity ratio 
within the project company, it has a positive ef-
fect on an equitable risk and loss sharing be-
tween the External Investor as Principal and the 
Investor-Developer as Agent.
2a. Moral hazard: The higher stake of the Devel-
oper as Agent in the investment has a positive 
effect on his behavior in avoiding opportunistic 
actions against the interests of the Investor as 
Principal.
2b. Moral hazard: An optimal trade-off between 
a behavior and outcome based management 
agreement reduces opportunistic behavior of 
the Center Manager as Agent, while minimizes 
transaction costs for the Investor as Principal.
 3. Adverse selection: The higher the transaction 
costs for verifying the value of the to be pur-
chased asset/project company the more likely 
to decrease the possibility of adverse selection.
 4. Out-coming solutions: The out-coming solutions 
from the fall of shopping centers are initiated 
and often brought to an end by the Principal of 
the respective principal-agent problem.
The gathered available data will permit the analy-
sis of the Propositions 0, 1, 2a., 3 and 4. The analysis 
of Proposition 2b. lies outside the scope of the present 
article.
Research method
In identifying the agency theory problems underneath 
the fall of shopping centers in Romania and to test the 
above formulated assumptions we’ll use the qualitative 
research method of multiple-case studies. As Baxter – 
Jack (2008: p. 548.) reflects „a multiple case study ena-
bles the researcher to explore differences within and be-
tween cases. The goal is to replicate findings across cases 
[...] or predict contrasting results based on a theory.” The 
context of analysis is provided by the institutional back-
ground of failed shopping centers. As such we consider 
failed shopping centers, those centers which were/are un-
dergone either an insolvency/bankruptcy/forced execu-
tion, got closed or were sold as distressed assets.
The units of analysis for these cases are the prin-
cipal-agent problems within these contexts and the 
guiding conceptual framework for data analysis and 
interpretation is provided by the agency theory embed-
ded in the field of shopping centers. The falls will be 
described in detail, including the actors involved in 
these cases and the principal-agent relationships be-
tween them. The data for the case studies have been 
gathered from objective secondary sources – mainly 
articles from on-line newspapers as outlined at the end 
of references – over a time period ca. 6 years, covering 
the time span from 2006 till 2012. The gathered data 
have been centralized in a smaller database shown in 
Table 5. Data analysis already started during the time of 
data collection using the following techniques: pattern 
matching, explanation building and cross-case synthe-
sis (Yin, 2003).
Data analysis: Cases and results
As mentioned above the cases are gathered and organ-
ized in a small scale database, while each case is de-
scribed in detail following the same structural guide-
lines in order to enable comparison between the cases 
and the identification of similarities and differences. The 
sequence of the cases are aligned in accordance with the 
3 Scenarios described as different the Principal-Agent 
Relationships in the Shopping Center Industry.
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SCENARIO 1: the role of the investor, developer 
and center manager is played by one single corporate 
group.
Case 1: TRIDENT – in Sibiu has been developed by 
Trident Group led by a local investor. Trident Group 
operated a successful local chain of supermarkets, 
when decided to realize a shopping center in Sibiu 
with a Trident hypermarket as an anchor store. The 
center was completed in April 2009 having a gross 
leasable area of ca. 21.000 sq.m. after performing a 
total investment of 15 million euro. The Group as a 
whole has been using external financing up to a total 
value of 30 million euro provided by Romexterra 
(38%), BancPost, BRD, Piraeus Bank and Intesa 
San Paolo. Unfortunately the expectations haven’t 
met the actual results of the shopping center, thus 
the center has been closed in August 2009 and in-
solvency proceedings started against the whole 
group. As part of this proceeding, in August 2012, 
the center has been offered to sale under public ten-
der for a starting price of 1,592 million euro.
Case 2: COCOR – located in the heart of Bucharest is 
the reconstruction of an old commercial center. The 
Investor-Owners (Broadhurst Investments, Daniel 
Stoica, Liviu Ursan, Aurel Besliu, SIF Muntenia 
and SIF Transilvania) as Agents contracted a loan 
of 18 million euro from the Romanian Commercial 
Bank (BCR), local subsidiary of ERSTE Group AG 
in order to carry out a complete center refurbish-
ment which required a total investment of 25 million 
euro. Thus the debt-to-equity ratio of the investment 
was of ca. 72%. The center has been fully leased 
and re-opened in 2010 and is since in operation, al-
though the results showed weak turnover and lack 
of liquidity. Therefore, in 2012 BCR started forced 
execution proceeding against the project company 
at a starting price of 30 million euro. Some mistakes 
appeared in the legal proceeding and the difference 
between the reported estimated value (42 million 
euro) and the starting tender price (30 million euro) 
lead to the suspension of the procedure as no in-
terested party showed up. In the meantime the pro-
ject company transferred ca. 2 million euro to BCR 
starting the repayment of the senior debt.
SCENARIO 2: distinct corporations (groups) play 
the role of investors, developers and center managers.
Case 3: ARMONIA BRAILA – has been developed by 
RED Management Capital from a total investment 
of 45 million euro. The Investor and Co-owner was 
GED Capital – Warburg Pincus. In order to secure 
the needed investment beside the mezzanine capi-
tal, a senior debt of 35 million euro has been con-
tracted, out of which 28 million euro were provided 
by Volksbank. Therefore the debt-to-equity ratio 
within the project company was of 78%. The shop-
ping center with 29.500 sq.m. gross leasable area 
was opened in November 2008 having as anchor 
tenant a Carrefour hypermarket. The second phase 
of shopping gallery was lacking and not developed 
properly, therefore the hypermarket couldn’t hold 
and Carrefour closed its store shortly after opening; 
by July 2009 the complete center has been locked 
for closure. The creditors attempted to sell the cent-
er in 2012 through a public tender with a starting 
price of 25,03 million euro with no success.
Case 4: POLUS CENTER CONSTANTA / MARIT-
IMO – Polus Center Constanta was planned to be 
developed by the successful Hungarian real estate 
developer Trigranit. The total investment cost was 
estimated to 140 million euro. External financing 
was obtained from OTP Bank in the value of 40 
million euro. The project company was in the co-
ownership of Trigranit and an Austrian public listed 
investment fund called Immofinanz, who provided 
mezzanine capital and who also offered a forward 
purchase agreement at a fixed price of 185 million 
euro. During the development of the project, several 
problems appeared with the general contractor etc. 
and in 2010 Immofinanz decided to step in. Thus, 
he used his option to purchase the shares of the pro-
ject company, but instead of the previously estab-
lished purchase price, he paid 1 euro and assured 
OTP Bank to repay the senior debt. Subsequently 
the Investor-Principal took charge and completed 
the shopping center, which was opened in October 
2011 and re-branded as Maritimo. It is in operation 
since then.
Case 5: ATRIUM ARAD – is the first project of the Hun-
garian Developer Atrium Centers in Romania. The 
project company was 50-50% in the ownership of 
Atrium Centers and Carpathian PLC – Dawnay Day 
a UK based Investment Fund. The total investment 
cost was estimated to 70 million euro, with exter-
nal financing from MKB Bank in an amount of 59 
million euro, thus reaching a debt-to equity ratio of 
84%. The Developer selected as General Contractor, 
the construction company of Trigranit Group, called 
Arcadom and granted him a construction contract of 
44 million euro. In 2009, the UK listed Investment 
Fund, Carpathian PLC – Dawnay Day went broke, 
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and Atrium was in need for a new Investor, a new 
partner. Finally shortly after completion and open-
ing, in 2010, the General Contractor stepped in as 
new Investor and became 50% owner of the project 
company agreeing to a purchase price of 6 million 
euro for the shares – probably through a set-off re-
sulted from the general construction contract. The 
shopping center is since in operation.
Case 6: ARMONIA ARAD – has been developed by 
RED Management Capital with 43.500 sq.m. gross 
leasable area. The center opened in 2008 having 
Carrefour as anchor tenant and a shopping gallery. 
Immofinanz, the Investor and Co-owner signed a 
forward purchase agreement in 2007, committing 
him to pay 78 million euro for 75% of the SPV’s 
shares, despite the fact that the total investment was 
estimated to 50 million euro. The difference of 28 
million euro was sustained by a net present value 
(NPV) calculation with discounted cash flow esti-
mation on a long term. The financial and economic 
crisis and the fierce competition affected the shop-
ping center, which was closed in July 2012, shortly 
5 years after its opening. The risk adverse behavior 
of the External Investor as Principal was a major 
contribution to this closure. Immofinanz is now 
planning to refurbish and reposition the shopping 
center as an industrial/logistic plant.
SCENARIO 3: separate corporations (groups) car-
ry out the development activity and center management 
activity, while both play the role of investors.
Case 7: CITY MALL – The case of City Mall from 
Bucharest is the first and most famous failure of a 
shopping center in Romania. The center has been 
first bought by Star Mob Construct (Mr. Ioannis 
Papalekas) in 2005 for 46 million euro for the pur-
pose of further development and Exit. Finally, the 
19.000 sq.m. shopping center was opened in 2006 
and shortly after sold to the Australian APN Euro-
pean Retail Trust for 103,5 million euro. The sale 
purchase agreement was financed by Unicredit Tiri-
ac Bank and BancPost as External Investors with 
41 million euro, reaching a debt-to-equity ratio of 
39% from the total investment. The shopping cent-
er was in full operation since its opening and had 
an occupancy rate of at least 80%, still the center 
went through insolvency proceeding beginning with 
2009, and there were approx. 5 attempts to sell the 
shopping center through a public tender, which all 
failed due to lack of interested buyers. Finally in 
2011, the former Developer, Mr. Ioannis Papalekas 
decided to buy back the center through direct ne-
gotiation for a purchase price of 17,3 million euro. 
The shopping center is since in operation and shall 
be repositioned as an office center.
Case 8: TIAGO MALL / ORADEA SHOPPING CITY 
– Tiago Mall from Oradea is a shopping center start-
ed in 2007 by the Irish construction group Mivan. 
The total investment of the center was estimated 
to 70 million euro, which beside subordinate debt 
was secured by senior debt provided by Unicredit 
Bank Austria and Unicredit Tiriac Bank in the total 
amount of 65 million euro. The resulting debt-to-eq-
uity ratio was very high reaching 92% from the total 
investment. At the end of 2008 the developer failed 
to lease the shopping center. Thus, in the spring of 
2009 the project company entered into insolvency 
and after several failed public tenders, finally in 
2010 the center was bought by a company belong-
ing to Baneasa Investments for 30,5 million euro. 
The acquisition was re-financed by Unicredit Bank 
Austria with some conditions on operating the shop-
ping center. The new Investor-Principal rebranded 
the shopping center into Oradea Shopping City and 
leased it in approx. 40%, so that the center could be 
opened in 2011, since which is in operation.
Case 9: LIBERTY CENTER – in Bucharest is the pro-
ject of the Irish construction group Mivan devel-
oped in partnership with the Lebanese Awdi Group. 
They’ve started the development with the scope of 
selling it to an institutional investor after its comple-
tion. The total investment of the center was estimat-
ed to 70 million euro, for which external financing 
was obtained in the value of 61 million euro from 
external investors like Alpha Bank, Eurobank EFG 
and Cyprus Bank and thus reaching to a debt-to-eq-
uity ratio of 87%. The shopping center with 25.000 
sq.m. gross leasable area was opened in 2008 and 
is ever since in operation. As the senior debt felled 
due in 2012 and the project company proved to be 
unable to repay it, the banks decided to start forced 
execution and take control over the shopping center 
through a direct sale / set-off.
Case 10: EUROPEAN RETAIL PARK BRAILA – The 
European Retail Park in Braila has 53.000 sq.m. 
GLA and opened its gates in 2008 after the devel-
opment of BelROM a Belgian developer. The total 
investment costs were estimated to 60 million euro, 
out of which 40 million was provided by KBC Se-
curities from Belgium, resulting in a debt-to-equity 
ratio of 66%. Shortly after completion, the center 
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was sold as distressed asset to the South African 
public listed investment fund called New Europe 
Property Investment (NEPI) for 63 million euro, 
slightly above the estimated total investment cost. 
Nevertheless the transaction couldn’t have been tak-
ing place, if the External Investor, KBC Securities 
wouldn’t have been offering a credit line to finance 
beside this purchase also another project in a pack-
age deal.
Overview of cases:  
pattern matching and cross-cases synthesis
The cases of failed shopping centers in Romania dur-
ing the period of 2006–2012 are described above in 
detail and grouped alongside their context of analysis, 
respectively based on the relational structures between 
the involved actors as formulated through the 3 Scenar-
ios mentioned in the theoretical background. Regard-
less of the relational structure as distinct contexts, all of 
the cases showed signs of risk sharing related agency 
problems. Therefore this seems to be a general problem 
of the whole shopping center industry and is strictly 
related to project financing issues with the involve-
ment of external investors, lenders and banks. In align-
ment with the expectations, the simpler the relational 
structures between the involved actors, the less agency 
problems arise. As a consequence, in cases of Scenar-
io 1 (Trident, Cocor), where the Agent plays the role 
of the Developer, Center Manager and Investor in the 
same time, while there is an External Investor-Lender 
as Principal, the only agency problem which occur is 
risk sharing. 
The more market actors are involved and the more 
complex is the relationship structure between them 
as described in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, additional 
agency problems appear as moral hazard or adverse 
selection. Due to the low level of transactions during 
the analyzed period of 2006–2012 full of waves of 
default, moral hazard (5 cases: Armonia Braila, Po-
lus Center/Maritimo, Atrium Arad, Tiago Mall/OSC, 
Liberty Center) appeared more frequently than adverse 
selection (4 cases: Armonia Arad, City Mall, Tiago 
Mall/OSC, European Retail Park Braila). In fact two 
of the discovered adverse selections in case of Armo-
nia Arad and City Mall have roots before the crisis, in 
2006; however, light shed on the problems only after 
the crisis. The ownership structure of the SPV, whether 
co-owned by the Developer (Armonia Braila, Polus 
Center/Maritimo, Atrium Arad) or fully owned by him 
(Tiago Mall/ OSC, Liberty Center), had no influence 
on the occurrence of moral hazard. Nor has the debt-to-
equity ratio influence on the occurrence of risk sharing, 
as shopping centers with the lowest levels like Polus 
Center/Maritimo (29%) and City Mall (39%), as well 
as shopping centers with the highest levels like Tiago 
Mall/OSC (92%) and Liberty Center (87%) both suf-
fered from risk sharing. Actually the highest loss of 
an External Investor was recorded in the case of Tiago 
Mall/OSC where Unicredit Bank Austria and Unicredit 
Tiriac Bank jointly lost 54% of the senior debt, 29,5 
million euro. 
This shopping center seemed to be actually the only 
one where all agency problems occurred simultane-
ously: risk sharing with the lenders, moral hazard with 
the developer (Mivan Group) and adverse selection 
with the investor, Baneasa Investment who bought it 
through a public tender for 30,5 million euro and since 
then struggles to keep the center open. Nevertheless, 
the highest record of loss is registered in the case of 
City Mall, where by the adverse selection of the In-
vestor APN European Retail Trust acquiring the mall 
for 103,5 million euro and re-selling it for 17,3 million 
euro, ultimately resulted in a loss of 86,2 million euro 
representing 83% from the total investment. With this 
City Mall registered itself in the history of failed shop-
ping centers in Romania and is currently repositioned 
as an office center. Another interesting case of adverse 
selection is represented by the forward purchase of Ar-
monia Arad by Immofinanz paying a 28 million sur-
plus in addition to the development costs for acquiring 
the SPV. In five years from the purchase the center has 
been closed with the hope of repositioning as an in-
dustrial plant. Most of these agency problems came to 
light by the initiative of the lenders, banks starting to 
write off the non-performing loans (NPL’s) or by one 
of the Co-owners and thus were started by a Principal 
and also solved by the same Principal (Polus Center/
Maritimo, Armonia Arad, Tiago Mall/OSC, Liberty 
Center, European Retail Park Braila). Three shopping 
centers: Trident, Cocor and Armonia Braila are in ex-
pectation of a solution, while City Mall and Atrium 
Arad represent odd-one-outs. In their cases the solu-
tions came from the Agents, either in partnering against 
the fall-out of an investor (Atrium Arad) or by bringing 
developer know-how and experience in repositioning 
the facility (City Mall).
In general we could conclude that wherever moral 
hazard appeared, it was triggered by the lack of know-
how and experience of the involved Developers, while 
adverse selection occurred due to Investors trying to 
minimize transaction costs. Thus, each of these agency 
problems is strictly related to one category of involved 
actors: risk sharing problem is associated with lenders, 
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moral hazard with developers and adverse selection 
with investors. The solutions to these problems how-
ever depend much more on the lenders and investors as 
Principals, than on developers as Agents.
Results on propositions
Having presented all of these cases in detail and while 
conducting a cross-cases synthesis we can go back to 
test our propositions. Table 6. contains the summary of 
the results drawn from the analyses based on the test-
able propositions.
It turns out, that Risk Sharing remains the most 
serious agency theory related problem in the industry 
of shopping centers – being an underlying problem in 
all shopping centers failures. Therefore, proposition 0 
should be accepted. Risk and loss sharing between the 
Developer-Agent and the Lender-Principal is never eq-
uitable. Although in some of the cases the lower debt-
to-equity ratio has a positive effect on loss sharing, the 
proposition 1 can’t be accepted, nor generalized as for 
instance in case of City Mall with the lowest debt-to-
equity ratio of 39%, the Investor lost everything, while 
the Lenders recovered less than half of the senior debt. 
Neither can we accept proposition 2a, since regardless 
of the stake of the Developer (full ownership in cases 
of Scenario 3 – or only co-ownership in cases of Sce-
nario 2), the losses suffered by the Developers are con-
siderable. Perhaps a better assessment of these losses as 
a result of moral hazard could be reached by substitut-
Shopping Center
P0:
Principal-Agent 
problem behind 
of fall
P1:
Risk sharing:
debt-to-equity 
ratio
P2a:
Moral Hazard: 
stake of the 
Developer
P3:
Adverse
Selection – 
transaction costs
P4:
Outcoming 
solutions: 
Principal’s role
Trident Risk Sharing NA – –
Initiated by the 
Principal
Cocor Risk Sharing 72% – –
Initiated by the 
Principal
Armonia Braila
Moral Hazard
Risk Sharing
78% Co-ownership –
Initiated by the 
Principal
Polus Center/ 
Maritimo
Moral Hazard
Risk Sharing
29% Co-ownership –
Initiated and solved 
by the Principal
Atrium Arad
Moral Hazard
Risk Sharing
84% Co-ownership –
Initiated by the 
Principal but solved 
by the Agent
Armonia Arad
Adverse Selection
Risk Sharing
NA –
Forward purchase 
agreement – low 
transaction costs
Initiated and solved 
by the Principal
City Mall
Adverse Selection
Risk Sharing
39% –
In 2006 direct sale 
– low transaction 
costs
Initiated by the 
Principal and solved 
by the Agent
Tiago Mall/ OSC
Moral Hazard
Risk Sharing
Adverse selection
92% Full ownership
Bankruptcy 
proceedings, 
public tender-high 
transaction costs
Initiated and solved 
by the Principal
Liberty Center
Moral Hazard
Risk Sharing
87% Full ownership –
Initiated and solved 
by the Principal
European Retail 
Park Braila
Adverse Selection
Risk Sharing
66% –
After completion 
sale as distressed 
asset – low 
transaction costs
Initiated and solved 
by Principals
RESULT ACCEPTED REJECTED REJECTED ACCEPTED
PARTIALLY 
ACCEPTED
Table 6
Summary of results based on the tested propositions 
Source: own compilation
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ing the stake of the developer with his know-how and 
experience. Proposition 2b, as mentioned previously 
wasn’t subject of analysis. Most of the ownership trans-
fers occurring as solutions to failed shopping centers 
were undertaken either through public tender or forced 
execution. These represent high transaction costs in 
comparison to direct sales or forward purchase agree-
ments. Thus proposition 3 should be accepted. The fall 
of shopping centers is in all cases initiated by either the 
Lender-Principal or by the Investor-Principal. Never-
theless we’ve encountered cases when the solution was 
found by the Developer-Agent like in case of Atrium 
Arad or City Mall from Bucharest. Therefore proposi-
tion 4 should be only partially accepted, as the problem 
is discovered and the solution initiated by the Princi-
pals, but the ultimate solution might come also from 
the Agents. In summary from the total of six proposi-
tions, we’ve accepted two (Proposition 0 and 3), reject-
ed two (Proposition 1 and 2a), partially accepted one 
(Proposition 4) and haven’t tested one (Proposition 2b).
Although, we haven’t used several sources for data 
collection in order to assure triangulation through mul-
tiple viewpoints, but having in mind that multiple-cases 
studies have been used as research method, the results 
could be considered robust and reliable. The reliability 
in the phase of data collection was assured through the 
review of a multitude of news articles related to each 
given shopping center. Reliability of the findings is fur-
ther enhanced by the fact that the analyzed cases rep-
resent 100% of the failed shopping centers in Romania 
during the studied time period of 2006–2012. Neverthe-
less, in Romania the total number of existing shopping 
centers, retail parks and outlet centers is of 139 (Regio-
Data, 2012), which means that the analyzed cases would 
be equal with a sample of 7% from the total units. Due 
to the high degree of complexity of these contexts, each 
shopping center project might be the result of differ-
ent principal-agent relationship construct; therefore it is 
questionable whether the results have validity also in 
different constructs and settings.
Conclusions and recommendations
The present article assesses agency theory problems 
contributing to the fall of shopping centers in Romania. 
In this view 10 failed shopping centers were selected 
and analyzed in detail in the form of multiple-cases 
studies. The theoretical background for the analysis is 
given by the positivist agency theory perspective ap-
plied to the institutional background of the shopping 
center industry. One of the main contributions of the 
paper is the formulation of the theoretical framework 
focused on the principal-agent relationships and prob-
lems within the shopping center industry. This is a 
novelty as studies thus far focused on agency problems 
only on the housing market (Levitt – Syverson, 2008), 
on public-private projects (Lyonnet du Moutier, 2010) 
or simply between borrowers and lenders (Allen – 
Gale, 2000), shareholders and portfolio managers (Al-
len – Gorton, 1993) or within banks (Mishkin, 1997; 
Acharya – Naqvi, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the empirical research focusing on 
micro-level multiple cases also offers interesting in-
sights in the shopping center industry itself and its 
institutional-organizational structure. Results suggests 
that agency theory problems indeed contribute to the 
fall of shopping centers, at least in the form of risk 
sharing, which appeared in all cases, due to project fi-
nancing and SPV’s specifications, which is in line with 
Jensen (1983) and Allen – Gale (2000). Another inter-
esting result is the fact that in this risk sharing cases, 
the External Investor, Lender as Principal acts the most 
risk neutral and impatient instead of the Developer as 
Agent or Investor as Principal; as a consequence he is 
the one who initiates in most of the cases a solution 
to the falling of the shopping center. This finding is in 
contrast with Watanabe (2010) suggesting that banks 
engage in evergreening in case of large losses of capi-
tal, which might suggest that banks use evergreening 
only on short term, as buffer, in order to assure in paral-
lel a stable writing-off of NPL’s. The most of risks and 
losses are bared in all of the cases by the Developer 
as Agent or the Investor as Principal. This would call 
for a careful selection of External Investors, Lenders 
in the early development stage of the shopping center, 
which should be based on trust and long term relation-
ship. Surprisingly and in contrast with the expectations, 
Moral Hazard problems seem to appear not because of 
the low level of the Developer-Agent’s stake as sug-
gested by Jensen – Meckling (1976), but because of 
the lack of know-how and experience in the field of 
shopping centers.
This should stay as warning for self-appointed 
speculative Developers with no experience and lack 
of know-how. Adverse selection is nearly inevitable in 
case of forward purchase agreements and very prob-
able in case of direct sales, even in case of distressed 
assets. The higher the transaction costs through bank-
ruptcy proceedings, public tender or forced execu-
tion, the less likely to face adverse selection during 
ownership change. The solutions to the failure of the 
shopping centers are in all of the cases initiated by a 
Principal, although sometimes ultimately solved by an 
Agent. All these findings reflect a high degree of diver-
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sity depending on the contextual setting, institutional-
organizational background behind each shopping cent-
er. Thus, the validity and generalization of results is 
questionable, even though reliability is assured by the 
research method of multiple-cases studies. Therefore 
further research should focus on assessing agency the-
ory problems in different settings, for example in dif-
ferent countries like India, where the financing of these 
projects relies much more on opportunistic behavior, 
attracting funds from speculators by selling prior com-
pletion some parts of the shopping center (Singh et al, 
2009). Still, the novelty of the topic in the shopping 
center industry and the empirical evidences with solu-
tions confer a significant academic and practical value 
for the present article.
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On-line sources for data collection  
on the cases, all reviewed on 08. 12. 2012:
 1. http://www.capital.ro/detalii-articole/stiri/trigranit-isi-
amana-planurile-din-romania-dupa-ce-si-a-renegociat-
creditele-125134.html
 2. http://www.businesscover.ro/28-10-2011-maritimo-shopping-
center-mallul-de-un-euro-al-immofinanz-se-deschide-azi/
 3. http://www.dailybusiness.ro/stiri-real-estate/constructorul-
mall-ului-din-arad-a-cumparat-jumatate-de-proiect-cu-o-zi-
inainte-de-inaugurare-40312/
 4. http://www.wall-street.ro/slideshow/Real-Estate/82568/ 
Ce-urmeaza-dupa-vanzarea-a-50-din-Atrium-Center-Arad.html
 5. http://www.ared.ro/logisticparc/index.php?lng=en-pag=stiri-
stire_id=95-immoeast-deschide-mall-ul-armonia-in-arad-la-
sfarsitul-lunii-mai
 6. http://www.cijjournal.com/immofinanz-closes-armonia-arad/
 7. http://www.zf.ro/business-construct/immoeast-preia-centrul-
comercial-armonia-arad-3063555/
 8. http://www.curierulnational.ro/Actualitate%2 
Companii/2008-05-28/Aradul+are+mall+de+50+de+milioan
e+de+euro
 9. http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Real-Estate/72708/Toamna-
se-numara-tranzactiile-NEPI-da-63-mil-euro-pentru-un-parc-
comercial-din-Braila.html
10. http://realestate.doingbusiness.ro/ro/news/news_item.
php?newsid=1721
11. http://www.doingbusiness.ro/ro/stiri-afaceri/13786/european-
retail-park-braila-a-fost-preluat-in-urma-unei-tranzactii-de-63-
milioane-euro
12. http://www.capital.ro/detalii-articole/stiri/tranzactie-
imobiliara-de-63-mil-euro-la-braila-126069.html
13. http://www.incomemagazine.ro/articol_81742/lichidatorul-
bdo-a-vandut-primul-spatiu-al-falimentarului-trident-afla-
detalii.html?action=print
14. http://www.capital.ro/detalii-articole/stiri/inca-un-mall-din-
bucuresti-a-fost-scos-la-licitatii-169158.html
15. http://www.zf.ro/proprietati/liberty-center-a-fost-vandut-intr-
un-dosar-de-executare-silita-pretul-de-pornire-era-de-60-mil-
euro-cumparator-bancile-creditoare-9928288
16. http://www.incomemagazine.ro/articol_85979/cocor-a-scapat-
pentru-moment-de-vanzarea-prin-licitatie-impusa-de-bcr.html
17. http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Real-Estate/91117/Banii-
pentru-Tiago-Mall-Oradea-au-fost-virati-Finantarea-vine-tot-
de-la-UniCredit.html
18. http://media.imopedia.ro/stiri-imobiliare/armonia-braila-pe-
urmele-city-mall-a-treia-licitatie-si-nimeni-nu-vrea-sa-dea-25-
mil-euro-pe-el-19378.html
19. http://ziuadecj.realitatea.net/economie/au-adus-la-cluj-350-de-
milioane-de-euro–40852.html
20. http://www.sibiul.ro/stiri-locale/belrom-a-deschis-galaxia-
magazinelor-media-galaxy/7859/
21. http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Real-Estate/111706/City-
Mall-vandut-pentru-17-3-mil-euro-Banii-merg-la-banca-
proprietarul-nu-primeste-nimic.htm
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